Methods of Compensating Judicial Errors from the Perspective of Imamiyyah Jurisprudence

Abstract

Today, given the complexity of crimes, the responsibility of judges in adjudicating and issuing verdicts holds exceptional sensitivity. Judges are entrusted with protecting the life, property, and honor of citizens, and even the slightest negligence or error can lead to significant material and moral damages—or even deprive a person of their right to life. Until the first half of the twentieth century, judges possessed absolute authority in issuing judgments, and it was commonly assumed that they enjoyed a form of immunity. However, this situation did not persist, as emerging intellectual movements challenged this assumption and gradually succeeded in enacting legal provisions to address judicial errors or misconduct. As a result, most contemporary legal systems around the world—regardless of their structural differences—have accepted the principle of compensating for judicial errors. In the Iranian legal system, it is stipulated that if a judge’s fault in issuing an erroneous judgment is proven, he is responsible for compensating the resulting damages. The competence to determine such fault lies with the Prosecutor’s Office and the Judicial Disciplinary Court. The foundations of this principle are rooted in Qur’anic verses, narrations, and established rules in Imamiyyah jurisprudence—such as the principles of la darar (no harm) and tasbib (causation)—all of which share the common emphasis on the necessity of compensating damages. In light of Article 171 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the legislator has formally recognized the principle of compensation and the liability of both the state and judges in the case of judicial errors. Furthermore, Article 58 of the Islamic Penal Code (ratified in 1991 CE) reiterates and reinforces the provisions of this principle.