Individual Freedom or Social Justice? The Relationship Between Theories of Justice and Liberal Public Law Institutionalization

Abstract

The theoretical tradition of justice within the liberal discourse has consistently sought to reconcile its commitment to negative freedoms with the institutional requirements of justice, leading to multiple interpretations of the relationship among the individual, the state, and power. These range from libertarian defenses of the most minimal form of public authority to theories such as justice as fairness (Rawls) or the capability approach (Sen), both of which call for a redefinition of the state’s mission to ensure equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, the question of whether justice can be realized within the framework of the minimal state—as an institutional form of limiting political authority—remains one of the most intricate theoretical controversies in liberal public law. This study, grounded in the conceptual framework of liberal theories of justice and through a comparative analysis of the institutional experiences of the United States and the United Kingdom, seeks to identify mechanisms capable of realizing justice as both an institutional and distributive matter within the structures of a minimal state. The analysis reveals that the central challenge lies not in the magnitude of state authority but in the quality of its architecture; reducing justice to a merely negative concept effectively suspends the duty of solidarity within the public order. The findings indicate that a small state, if guided by justice-oriented rationality and intelligent institutional design, is not inherently in conflict with justice but can instead embody novel capacities for its realization. This research, conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, outlines a conceptual horizon for reconstructing the compatibility of freedom and justice in contemporary public law.