Examination of the Punishment of Efsād fi al-Arz in the Crime of Disrupting the Economic System from the Perspective of Criminal Jurisprudence

Abstract

Among the most essential human needs throughout life are financial needs. Without considering such needs, life cannot endure. This has caused human beings throughout history to devote the utmost effort and diligence to economic activities. Islam has affirmed these activities with great clarity, referring to them as a form of sacred struggle. In Islamic teachings, the ultimate aim of economic activity is attaining closeness to God and seeking His pleasure. In this regard, the well-being of the family, the individual, and society is oriented toward social justice and genuine equity. This study, using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Islamic jurisprudential sources, seeks to examine the foundations of disrupting the economic system from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. In the Holy Qur’an, the notion of mufsid fi al-arz (one who spreads corruption on earth) is mentioned repeatedly; however, it has not explicitly been designated as the subject of a specific criminal sanction. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical approach, we examine efsād fi al-arz as the punishment assigned to the crime of disrupting the economic system in Islamic jurisprudential sources, given that Iranian law is derived from jurisprudence and its basis and foundation lie in Islamic teachings, which is reflected in legislation. The aim of this research is to determine whether, according to jurisprudential texts, there is proportionality between the committed act, the criminal designation assigned to it, and the punishment prescribed. Criminalizing efsād fi al-arz as an offense independent from mohārebeh (armed rebellion) and prescribing the death penalty for it appears to be somewhat illogical within criminal law, because first, the term efsād fi al-arz has not been independently discussed in classical jurisprudential texts, and jurists have addressed it under the category of mohārebeh. Moreover, the argument asserting that there must be a necessary correspondence between the establishment of Sharīʿa rulings and their explicit designation in the wording of jurists is not compelling.