Civil Evidence in the U.S. Legal System with a Perspective on Islamic Jurisprudence and Iranian Law

Abstract

The evaluation of evidentiary material is common across all legal systems worldwide; a mere presentation of evidence does not suffice for accepting a claim. In order to prove a matter, beyond the submission of evidence, the probative value of that evidence is also crucial. The concept of “evaluation of evidence” refers to the psychological conviction expressed by the judge that what the claimant has presented persuades them regarding the alleged event. Since the purpose of adducing evidence is to prove a fact from which the claimed right is inferred, evidence only achieves its ultimate aim when it convinces the judge, either by bringing them to certainty or by creating such a strong presumption that reason can rely upon it. The judge’s discretion in evaluating evidence is natural and inherent to their competence in discerning rights and adjudicating cases. Therefore, if the legislator, for the sake of maintaining order or protecting the claimant, obliges the judge to treat certain evidence as decisive or conclusive regardless of their internal conviction, this must be deemed exceptional and contrary to the general principle. It is worth noting that Article 200 of the Iranian Code of Civil Procedure has incorporated as a common condition for all types of evidence, under the general rules of evidence, that courts should only consider evidence relating to facts that affect the judgment — meaning that, in terms of substance, one must be able to establish the asserted claim by relying on the content and implications of the evidence presented. Judicial freedom in evaluating evidence is one of the significant characteristics of the inquisitorial system of adjudication. This feature distinguishes inquisitorial civil proceedings from other procedural models. Today, legislators also view the attainment of the aims of adjudication as dependent on trusting the judge’s ability to assess evidence. Consequently, attention to this principle has been expanding rapidly in various countries, including Iran. The principle of judicial freedom in evaluating evidence allows the judge, in their quest for truth and in satisfying their conscience, to examine evidence in two stages. The first stage concerns evaluation in its broad sense — that is, determining the relevance and effectiveness of the evidence without regard to the specific evidentiary system. This stage is common across all legal systems and types of evidence. The second stage concerns the weighing of specific evidence. Importantly, this principle, though grounded in trust in the judge to reach the truth, is not unconditional; it does not authorize the judge to introduce personal desires or ulterior motives into adjudication. In other words, judicial freedom in evidence evaluation does not equate to judicial arbitrariness; rather, while enjoying discretion, the judge remains bound to rational principles and bears responsibility for adhering to them.