Evaluating the Effectiveness of Iran’s Executive Criminal Policy in Preventing Smuggling and Customs Violations: A Critical Assessment of Organizational Performance

Abstract

Smuggling and customs violations constitute one of the chronic challenges of Iran’s economy, the consequences of which extend beyond reduced government revenues to include disruption of trade policies, weakening of domestic production, and expansion of the informal economy. Despite the enactment of numerous laws in recent years, the effectiveness of executive criminal policy in confronting this phenomenon remains questionable, making it necessary to examine the gap between legislative criminal policy and its execution. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of Iran’s executive criminal policy in preventing smuggling and customs violations, with a focus on critiquing the institutional structure, examining implementation weaknesses, analyzing technological deficiencies, and exploring the consequences of misalignment between legislation and enforcement. This research adopts a descriptive–analytical approach based on documentary study. Data were collected from statutory laws, official reports of executive institutions, documents related to the performance of the Customs Administration and the Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, and relevant academic sources, and were analyzed using qualitative and institutional analysis methods. The findings indicate that Iran’s executive criminal policy faces four fundamental categories of challenges: a structural gap between legislative criminal policy and executive capacities; implementation problems, including institutional incoherence, overlapping mandates, and inadequate training of human resources; technological and informational deficiencies, such as the absence of integrated intelligent systems, weak data exchange, and lack of a risk management system; and supervisory and performance shortcomings within responsible organizations, including the Customs Administration, law enforcement agencies, and the Organization for the Enforcement of Governmental Punishments. These factors have led to reduced deterrence, increased opportunities for smuggling, and waste of supervisory capacity. The results demonstrate that enhancing the effectiveness of executive criminal policy in Iran requires a fundamental revision of the institutional structure, strengthening inter-organizational coordination, developing technological infrastructure, integrating information systems, and aligning legal provisions with the actual capacities of enforcement. Only through achieving coherence in criminal policy and addressing the legislative–executive gap can a sustainable reduction in smuggling and an improvement in the integrity of the national trade system be attained.