Legal Status of Victims of Neural Hacking in the Commission of Unintended Crimes: Examining the Defense of Cyber Coercion within the Criminal Liability Framework

Abstract

Recent advances in neurotechnology, brain–computer interfaces, and cognitive artificial intelligence have enabled direct intervention in human neural processes, giving rise to an emerging phenomenon known as “neural hacking.” In such circumstances, an attacker infiltrates neural systems or brain-connected devices and may disrupt an individual's volition, decision-making capacity, motor control, or perception, thereby placing that person in a situation where they unknowingly or involuntarily engage in criminal conduct. This development challenges the traditional foundations of criminal liability, including mens rea, free will, and behavioral control, and raises fundamental questions concerning the legal status of individuals who commit offenses while under the influence of neural interference. Adopting an analytical–critical approach, this article first examines the nature of neural hacking and various forms of cognitive, motor, and perceptual intervention. It then demonstrates that crimes resulting from such interventions often lack the requisite mental elements necessary for the attribution of criminal responsibility. Subsequently, the legal status of victims of neural hacking is analyzed, and it is argued that such individuals should not be regarded as autonomous offenders but rather as instrumentalities of crime, and therefore should be exempt from criminal liability. The article further explores the emerging defense of “cyber coercion” as a novel extension of traditional defenses based on physical and psychological coercion, demonstrating that advanced criminal justice systems may recognize this defense in situations involving the absence of neural control. The findings indicate that existing criminal justice systems are inadequately prepared to address offenses arising from neural hacking and require fundamental reforms concerning criminal liability, the burden of proof, attribution rules, and the definition of new offenses associated with neural interference. Finally, the article proposes a series of legislative and policy recommendations that may serve as the foundation for developing a forward-looking legal framework governing cyber-cognitive crimes.